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My purpose in this paper is to raise---without expecting to finally 
resolve--·the quest.ion of the doctrinal significance of the several interna.1 
cross-references of Plato's dialogues, and particularly his indications of 
their proper sequence for the reader. 
There are two reasons for this exploration, one metaphysical, one 
largely te.chnical. The technical reason is that those of us who insist on 
the inseparability of 111.iterar/'and "argument" dimensions of Plato's work 
have not done very well in articulating the larger literary questions of 
sequence as functions of the central drama of ideas. The _metaphysic:J.l reason 
is that there is a necessary problem of perspective inherent in the Platonic 
theory of forms, anticipat<-0d in Plato's O\vn statements, and destined to 
haunt the Platonic tradition, dividing it into a Neo-Platonic formalism and 
an alternative 11process" position. 
Platonic metaphysics does not lend itself to literal, didact.;r: presen­
tati.on. Part, at least, of the reason is that the metaphysician must address 
us from a definite standpoint in his report. If that standpoint looks to the 
forms as future alternative goals or values, its prospective account will 
differ from the pu:cely descriptive accounts of the forms as classes or uni­
versals which look at them in a non-temporal eternal present. In short; the 
different functions of the forms involve different refractions through be.�;ond.n.g, 
and no one account from a given aspect can do justice to the theory. And 
there are also other problems of perspective. One of these is the relation 
of the knower to what is knowable or knov-rn; another is the puzzling case of 
participation. 
Very early in his career, as he tried r.o develope his defense of Socrates 
into a syst�natic philosophic vision, Plato discovered this difficulty. 
Having written the Phaedo, in whic:h Socrates has attained "blessedness!! by 
his incarnation cf -the form of justice, Plato i.elt compelled to complete the. 
picture with the contrasting Symposium. Where the Phaedo gives forms that 
are perfect, pure, and attainable, the Symposium gives forms which lie at 
the end of an impossible quest for immortality through a demonic pursuit of 
creativity .1 If for an instant the Symposiu� allows a glimpse of The B•:!au­
tiful, chat glimpse is followed by a return to time in which the philosopher 
again functions as a daimon. The two dialogues, by every test of style> 
structure, and historical refezence, were written at almost the saDe date. 
· They a1P internally linked by parallel details, indicating their relation 
to be that of a comedy. to a tragedy--as an initial po:i.nt of such relatedness, 
• pointinz up the contrast, we note that the patron god of the -�ymposJ::!:!E� is 
Dionysu�;, the patron of the R_�.§.�.i!.�. is Apollo. 
This at: tempt to do the portrait of Socrates and his tboug1.:t properly� 
by doing it twice, in contrasting lights and styles, addresses a problf�m 
that is reflected throughout the Platonic tradition. Within that tradition, 
there tends to be polarization between interpretations which follow the Ph�<{��� 
in a stress on the purity and remoteness of the real world�-this is the or:i,en- , 
tation of Neo·-Platonism--and interpretations more appreciative of the role 
of Eros, of the forms as cre::-it.ive powers--this is the orientation, today,_�-- . ':�,.?· 
process philosophy; earlier, Rena:l.ssance admirers of the J.?2'.!.:.:P.ES:.:i.um share 
-
the view. . 
I 
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The-theme of my present discussion is that Plato's indications of 
the inter-relations of various sets of dialogues represent an intention 
on his part of indicating relatively complete perspectival accounts of his 
philosophy. How optimistic he was about the final success of the most 
am�itious of these ventures, a programmed sequence of eight successive 
Socratic discourses, to provide a complete perspective-including picture 
we are not sure. But the final judgment of Letter VII, Plato's or not (and 
I am certain that it is his own) is surely right, that Platonic philosophy 
does not lend itself,-as other topics do, to literal, textbook forms of 
statement.2 
It is generally assumed by twentieth-century readers that the doctrines 
of the "later dialogues" and of the middle ones, particularly the Phaedo, 
are incompatible. The explanation usually given is that Plato discovered 
that the "middle dialogue" theory of forms was unsatisfactory. First, it 
was stronger than it needed to be to explain the phenomena of knowledge and 
connnuriication which it had been devised to account for; and second, it was 
not coherent in the face of rigorous logical analysis. It is also widely 
assumed in our century that a satisfactory but metaphysically far more modest 
theory is offered in the "logical" later dialogues. 
What I now propose to do is first, to organize the dialogues into groups 
related by internal cross-reference or by common strategy; second, to show 
how this illuminates the interrelation of the later, logical, series; third, 
to reconscruct the location and method of The Philosopher as part of this 
projected set; fourth, to show that if the Phaedo is correctly read, it can 
appropriately come after The Philosopher in a dialectical order.3 If this is 
convincing, it will have shown that the open alternatives for understanding 
Plato remain, as they have always been, a Neo-Platonic stress on transcen­
dence or a Process Philosophy stress on immanence and emergence; and that 
contemporary attempts to read Plato as an analytic or linguistic philosopher 
completely miss the intended strategy of the texts pressed into service in 
this Megarian enterprise. 
After the death of Socrates, young Plato--presumably in Megara--began 
writing dialogues in defense of his older friend and hero. The Euthyphro, 
Apologz, and Crito certainly belong here. Of these, the first defends 
Socrates against the charge of impiety, by contrasting his attitude toward 
religion and the gods with that of the fundamentalist Euthyphro. The second, 
a recreation of Socrates' speech at his trial, at once makes it clear what 
the real basis of the charges against him was (namely, his persist�nt inquiry), 
and brings out his seriousness. (Xenophon's Apology is evidence that many 
Athenians saw Socrates as a kind of eccentric crank.) The third defends 
Socrates against the charge of bad citizenship, implied in the phr�sing of 
both counts of the indictment. The form of these works is highly dramatic, 
brief, and with a minimum of metaphysics and no didactic doctrine. A next 
step of dialogues is the Lysis-Laches Charmides triad, which defend Socrates 
against the charge of corrupting the youth, by showing him in action. The 
case studies are designed to show the good effect of his conversation on young 
audiences--if not always on elderly generals. Again, the form is highly 
dramatic, the conversations inconclusive and brief (an Aristotelian critic 
would say that Plato here deliberately uses a form that has a beginning and 
middle, but no end), the emphasis is ethical and metaphysics is relatively 
lacking. There was another charge, though an implicit one, that Plato felt 
the need to answer. This was the notion--central to Aristophanes' Clouds 
... 
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and-persisting in the public mind--that Socrates was j us t another Sophist. 
In fact, as Plato saw it, the whole project of Socrates' inquiry presupposed 
a possibility for objective non-relativistic treatment of ethical questions 
which was at the opposite pole from the sophisticated intellectuals of the 
"Sophist" persuasion. In presenting this line of defense, Plato has Socrates 
encounter the leading Sophists of the day. The dialogues are longer, the 
casts larger, the action more complex . An element of contest enters, with 
Socrates the winner. These discussions begin to include myths and to use 
mathematical examples. The theory that knowledg e is recollection becomes 
explicit in the Meno, one of the.latest dialogues in this set. 
In his middle dialogues, Plato tries to carry out the project of system­
atizing the philosophic vision of Socrates, and of offering a final philosoph.:. 
ical justification for his behavior and beliefs. Marvin Fox drew attention 
some years ago to the way in which S ocrates describes his final conversation 
as a "trial11 in which he defends his way of life before a jury of philosophers; 
:i.f Ionia.n naturalism were the final philosophic answer, Sacra tic idealism would 
indeed have been unrealis tic.4 The Phaedo is a presentation of S ocrates ' 
thoughts on immortality; it is a conclusion of the Euthyphro-Apology-Crito, 
but both form and content indicate a later date of composition, with the Socrates­
versus-the-Sophists studies, ending with the Meno, chronologically in between. 
But at the same time, the Symposium, as we haveseen , gives an alternative 
por tra i t of an engaged Socrat es, a daimon, in pursuit of immortality by crea­
tivity. By every criterion--style, relative length, s ystematic extension of 
philosophic insight--these two dialogues seem contemporary, and, as we have 
noted, parallel details stress their complementary character. But "the" 
Platonic philosophy they present has of fered a strong temptation to take one 
or the other. 
The middle dialogues continue with the great philosophic vision of the 
Republic, with its display of dialectic; and with the philosophical rhetoric 
,, f- of the Phaedus, where Socrates uses myth and cosmological argument to persuade 
his literat'ure-loving companion. 
In these dialogues, we are dealing with a full-scale philosophic vision: 
myth, mathematics, and metaphy sics alternate in importance; the method depends 
heavily on analogy and metaphor. The outcome is a picture of the sort of world 
iri which Socrates' conduct is justified, his vision confirmed, and a system­
atic metaphysics is established . In particular, the "diviJed line" of the 
Repub�i� summarizes a new epistemology and proposes a new plan of education, 
consistent with a Socratic inquiry that expects to find positive answers. 
These middle dialogues have interesting structural properties. The drama 
instantiates the argument, as the characters with their problems a'1d notions 
offer concrete examples of what the general discussion is about. ( Thus the 
cast of Republic ii-x has a spokesman for each of the three " parts of the soul.11) 
At the same time, when a method is an impo rtant topic of discussion , that method 
is illustrated by the contextual dialogue (so "dialectic" is exemplified by 
the Republic_, 11philosophical rhetoric" by the Phaedrus.) But we are still 
dealing with a ph ilosophic vision, with an emphasis on speculative coherence 
that se_ts aside, for the time, sharp critical precision and testing. 
This leaves Plato, after the middle dialogues, with three lines of inves­
tigation he must follow. The first is logical: can the four·-level theory 
of knowledge of the Republic establish itself against critics who argue that 
the forms are not intelligible, or that they are not needed, or that "kinds of 
4 
knowledge" may not be the extended four-part domain that the Republic 
supposes? The second line of needed further investigation is cosmological 
.£!:.physical: does the faith, expressed in Plato's myths, that nature and 
history are ordered with some regard to value find confirmation in empirical 
science and historical plausibility? The third line is ethic��: if this 
philosophy is true, it should be possible to take it back to the market 
place from the Academy, and to show that indeed, far from being "idle talking" 
(Isocrates' description of Plato's work in the Academy), it is a practical 
tool for human betterment. 
Quite clearly, it is the second of these purposes that motivated the 
projected Republic-Timaeus-Critias-Hermocrates tetralogy. Setting aside 
the more metaphysical portions of Socrates' account in the Republic, Timaeus 
concentrates on the empirical details of natural science and medicine.5 In 
the next dialogue, Critias moves from cosmology to mythical history with his 
"true" story of; a small but virtuous state (ancient Athens) triumphing over 
Atlantis, a large but bad one. Hermocrates, in turn, would be expected to 
give an account of the defeat of a later Athens that had lost the excellence 
of the "ancient Athens" of Critias' story. (Plato in fact transferred this 
theme vf Greek history to the Laws, leaving the Hermocrates unwritten and the 
Critias incomplete.) The theme of the Timaeus throughout is that natural 
phenomena can be explained by models and laws that embody aesthetic proper­
ties of beauty, simplicity, and precision. 
The third, applied and ethical, strategic target of Plato's popt.:...middle­
dialogue writings is clearly the strategic motivation of the Philebus and the 
Laws. The Philebus, both by theme ("not the good itself, but the good for 
human life"), and by choice of cast (young men who are not very philosophical) 
ce�ters on the practical application of philosophy; the Laws offers a concrete 
sample of the philosophic legislator in action, establishing "right measure." 
The first, logical, set of strategic sequels to the middle dialogues is 
a more complex affair. The set opens with the Parmenides, a dialogue with a 
double strategic purpose. The first point that is established is that neither 
the Megarian nor the Eudoxian interpretation of Socrates' theory of forms is 
tenable. Still, the forms are necessary to explain how knowledge is possible. 
The second strategic point of the Parmenides is its showing--by reductio proof-­
that forms on the poetic level are necessary for philosophy. For the attempt 
to treat metaphysics as a dianoetic, hypothetical-deductive enterprise runs 
into antinomies. (We recogn:!.ze what more is needed when we notice when the 
noeti� forms--the beautiful, the right, and the good--drop out of consideration 
with Parmenides.6) 
_ 
This gives a reductio proof that the forms are necessary, and that the 
"divided line" ontology cannot be sirriplified simply by dismissing the top 
level. Msgr. Dies caught this clearly in his remark that "the word nous and 
its derivatives are absent in this dialogue, with the exception of the rejec­
tion of conceptualism. • • 117 
What would happen, however, if someone with a pragmatic temperment and 
orientation argued that "forms" are philosophically redundant, whether we 
treat them as dianoetic classes or noetic systematic patterns? The answer is 
that it is impossible to explain the possibility of kinds of knowledge which, 
nevertheless, we actually have. For mere experience plus memory can never give 
us the necessity or universality of mathematics or Socratic ethics. The 
Theaetetus is Plato's indirect proof of this. The cast has been chosen so 
that we have a spokesman for, or representative of, each of the four kinds of 




experiment:§ with empirical and psychological models of learning--models 
which become the standard paradigms of much later Western psychology and 
epistemo1ogy--cannot explain Socratic ethics or pure mathematics. (And we 
are given examples in context--Theodorus' and Theaetetus' geometrical theorems, 
and Socrates "digression" on the lif e of the philosopher--which show that 
mathematical and philosophic knowledge are actual.) Plato concludes the 
dialogue with a cross-reference that makes this series intersect the earlier , 
biography of Socrates, set. This is not a mere casual afterthought: its 
intention is shmm throughout the discussion in the attention given to 
trials, lawyers, legal imagery (which would, without this explanation, seem 
pu zzling intrusions needing the sort of external explanation that Gilbert Ryle 
proposed 9) • , 
Cornford catches the point of the Theaetetus tersely, as Dies did for 
the anti-hypothesis motif of the Parmenides. "The forms do not appear," he 
writes; for the reason that Plato wants to show the futility of an attempt 
to do without them.10 If we c laim to have other entities, such as "concepts," 
"lingu istic dispositions" " impressions and ideas," that can substitu te for 
"forms," this is not a cla im or substitution that Plato endorsed! 
The participants in the Theaetetus recogni z e the existence of arts and 
crafts, which depend on rules and paradigms for their success in construction 
(e.g., of a wagon) and prediction (e.g., of the effect of an argument on a 
jury). But what if a critic of the theory of forms not only rejects the 
philosophic forms and the mathematical ones , but also, denying the common-sense 
world of paradigms and copies of the Theaetetus, insists on a total reduction 
of �2.?.:.§teme to ei�sia? Would anyone in fact do this? Yes, a thoroughgoing 
Sophist well might. But, as the next dialogue in Plato's series shows, the 
price he must pay for this is to give up the art of communication--of refutation, 
persuasion, or deception--and this deprives him of his income and function. 
The forms are still shown to be presupposed in this dialogue, but only in the 
very weakened roles they play as public "meanings " and "syntactical frameworks11 
which make d iscour se possible. In this and the following dialogue=, a great 
point is made of a new "method of division," whi ch is elaborately illustrated. 
At first, it seems that this may be abJ_e to handle the. relations of "forms" 
without reference to. sys tems , hierarchies, and so on; it does not turn out 
until late in the Statesman that the method in fac t presupposes more elaborate 
logical and metaphysic-al distinctions. (In the interim, our trust in it is 
weakened by its two def initions of "man," one as a featherless biped, one as 
a sub-species of pig!) With the final capture of the Sophist , at the end of 
the great hunt, this radical proposal for reduction of the "forms" to "icons 
and semblances" seems laid to rest. 
What one might now expe ct is a rehabilitation of the theory , arguing from 
Sophistic skill with appearances to arts and crafts, from arts and crafts to 
sciences of measure , from the formal metric studies to systems of crit er ia , the 
value forms. This expected return is begun in the Statesman, where the forms 
are presupposed by the art of statesmanship as the c-::-iteria for the "right 
amount" (to metrion) which separates the "too great" from the "too small." 
Since there are arts, and s inc e arts presuppose such cr iteria, there must be 
measures of this sort. We are tentatively promised a "later" discussion of 
the nature of "normative measure." 
As the dialogue sequence was designed, the Eleatic Stranger has served 
his turn: he has handled the levels of eikas ia and p istis _(taken together, 
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But to appreciate its location here in the sequence, the Phaedo must be 
correctly rea d .  In particular, one must not miss the relation of Socrates' 
two philosophic methods, nor the point of the final myth. Socrates, having 
given up natural science , recounts his further researches in two stages. 
First, he developes a new and powerful hypothetical-deductive logical method, 
intended to seek the strongest hypotheses; and with this method he shows 
that the psyche is indestructible.13 (The pro o f does not establish personal 
immortality, however.) But he had alrea dy had the idea of a s till better 
method, inspired by the quotation from Anaxagoras: this would be to relate 
the order of things, cosmos and forms alike, to The Good as a f irst principle.14 
If thi s could be done ,  perhaps philosophe::s could find evidence for the existence 
of Cosmic Justice written in the stars. And in a world ordered in that way, 
the fact that Socrates ought to have personal inunortality would lead to the 
conclusion that he does have it. But this revelation of the Good occurs here 
only as a story , a hope; it is a project bequeathed by Socrate s  to Plato. 
The Myth of the True Earth has two important properties. The first is 
that it is intended to show how the method of appeal to The Good would look as 
explanatory principle in empirical science. In this story, there is an exact 
match between the findings of scientific geology--of the impious a1..heists who 
pry into "things und�r the earth"--and the geography of purgatory taken from 
Orphic eschatology.lJ Having first solved the question of the shape and sta­
bility of the earth by an appeal to what is best, the mixture of geology and 
theology continues on this same line.16 
A second property of this story is that, as mythos should, the account 
changes abstractions into personifications and reifications. Thus the True 
Earth has showcases of precious stones and living gods who greet the visitors 
to their temples face-to-face. What is the invariability of the logical domain 
is replaced here by the beauty of the museum of perfect instantiation, Such 
projections are as philosophically misleading, when their proper statG.s is 
not recognized, as they are aesthetically and religiously effective. One can 
hardly resist comparing this great myth to Kant's account, in his Third Critique, 
of religious vision as an aesthetically coherent representation of "what we 
may hope." Like Plato's Socrates, Kant had his own conjectures� of a geography 
of the planetary system in which the various planets are stages for the edu­
cation of our souls.17 
By the time of his farewell to Socrates, before turning to the Laws, Plato 
had developed his philosophy systematically. As he wrote successive conversations 
he managed to correct--by anticipations if one follows the dramatic dates, by 
later revision if we follow the chronological dating--misinterpretations, and 
also to take account of new findings. In the end, he saw, Socrates' faith tn 
a total moral and aesthetic o rder , and in philosophy as the contemplation of it, 
remained not only a central hope, but the central doctrinal thesis of Platonism. 
But Socrates' last word was his message of purification and escape; and that 
s t ill did not do justice to the Socrates who challenged his fellow Athenians, 
bringing phi.losophy into the everyday arguments of the Agora. For that, a 
further extension was in order; an extension which would once more find its 
expression in a linked pair of aspects that modern readers at first glance 
find antithetical. And the two aspects of Platonism--the ascet ic moment of the 
Phaedo, where we see the whole earth from remote space, and the engaged activ­
ity of the Laws, where we measure every field and river in our own immediate· 
territory--once more combine in the final projected strategy of Plato's philo­
sophic presentation. An appendix to the Laws seems also to have been projected 
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by Plato, though it j_s doubtful how far our extant text represents his 
own execution, or if it is his, how completely it carries through his 
intention. But the 9inomis, a. sequel to the Laws, is an astronomical 
myth, parallel in location, similar in theme, and probably intended to be 
similar in its moral to the Myth of Er at the conclusion of the Republic. 
And both of these concluding postscripts seem to draw their inspiration, 
ultimately, from the Myth of the True Earth at the end of the Phaedo. 
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